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FRAUDULENT DIRECT SALES SCHEMES
IN THE HOME IMPROVEMENT INDUSTRY
UNDER NEBRASKA LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
Day after day the consumer is confronted with deceptive selling
practices. The widespread existence of such practices has led to
renewed recognition of the problem and vocal concern for con-
sumer protection. Following presidential notice of the problem by
President Kennedy in 1962,' President Johnson in 1964 called for
an "intensified campaign ... against the selfish minority who de-
fraud and deceive consumers, charge unfair prices, or are engaged
in other sharp practices. '2 President Nixon has acknowledged the
fact that in today's marketplace the consumer is confronted with
merchandising methods which result "in a degree of confusion that
often confounds the unwary, and too easily can be made to favor
the unscrupulous. ' 3 The result of such confusion is that about 200
billion dollars of the 750 billion dollars spent by consumers last
year was squandered through fraud, deception, and marketing in-
equities.4
There is evidence that consumer fraud and deception are most
commonly encountered by low income consumers who lack the
education or sophistication necessary to protect themselves. 5 The
President's Commission on Civil Disorders also noted that the ill will
and frustration caused by unconscionable marketing practices has
been a contributing cause of riots in the poverty areas of American
cities.6 However, while many problems do arise from the exploita-
tion of the poor, the uneducated and the elderly, the problem is not
1 108 CONG. REc. 4167, 4263 (1962) (message from President Kennedy
to Congress concerning consumer problems).
2 110 CONG. REC. 1958, 2095 (1964) (message from President Johnson to
Congress concerning consumer interests).
3 117 CONG. REc. 886 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1971) (special message to Con-
gress on a Buyer's Bill of Rights).
4 117 CONG. REC. 1944 (daily ed. Feb. 25, 1971) (remarks of Senator
Magnuson).
5 PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CONSUMER INTEREST, TnE MOST FOR THIR
MoNEY 7 (1965); Hearings on H.R. 7179 Before The Subcomm. of the
House Comm. on Government Operations, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
1 See REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDFRS
4, 81-82, 139-40 (1968).
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confined to these groups. The more affluent and the educated are
also exposed to and succumb to improper sales practices.
Of course, not all manufacturers and merchants participate in
questionable sales practices. The majority of sellers find it com-
mercially feasible to stand behind their representations, and many
go to great lengths to please their customers, not stopping with
their legal obligations but taking any reasonable action to promote
goodwill. But the fact that most sellers are responsible makes it
easier for the dishonest seller to trick the unwary. The consumer
expects honesty from the merchant. He has come to trust the
seller and his salesmen.
Such trust has resulted in vast numbers of new consumer com-
plaints each year. Specifically, complaints of home improvement
sales rank second in the incidence of all complaints filed with Better
Business Bureaus across the country.7 These statistics suggest that
fraudulent selling techniques are more frequently employed in the
field of direct selling than in any other phase of merchandising.
Several factors offer an explanation of this phenomenon.
First, while the average retail establishment at a fixed location
needs to maintain consumer goodwill to assure the repeat business
which will enable it to operate profitably over an extended period
of time, a direct seller is not bound by these same restrictions. Since
he can operate nearly as simply and economically over an extended
geographic area as over a small area, return business based on con-
sumer satisfaction is a less important consideration to his continued
operations.8 Secondly, the selling company has no chance to police
the actions of their salesmen in the buyer's home as it does when
they operate within a store. And since the door-to-door salesman
nearly always operates on a comnnission basis, the pressures upon
him to resort to any method which is likely to produce a sale are
great. Finally, since the consumer lacks a means of screening the
type of salesman who comes to his door, in contrast to the discretion
he may exercise in choosing the store in which he shops, he is less
likely to be able to distinguish the reputable from the disreputable.9
Both have equal access to his living room.
7 "Magazine sales" rank first, accounting for 8.2% of the Better Business
Bureau complaints; "home improvement and maintenance" is second
at 6.4%. See the testimony of Allan E. Bachman, Executive Vice-
President of the National Better Business Bureau, Hearings on S. 1599
Before the Consumer Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
90th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 90-63, at 130 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
1968 Hearings].
8 See Cuming, Consumer Protection-The Itinerant Seller, 32 SAsK.
L. I.v. 113, 115-16 (1967).
9 See 1968 Hearings 79 (statement of Senator Brewster).
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One would naturally suspect that the existence of these factors
tends to make fraud a more frequent accompaniment to direct
selling than to other types of merchandising. In fact, Chairman
Paul R. Dixon of the Federal Trade Commission has stated that in
the Commission's experience "dishonest and unethical businessmen
gravitate to ... door-to-dor [sic] selling."'10
Nebraska has recently been confronted with two cases involving
deceptive sales practices in a classic direct selling context. In Cen-
tral Construction Co. v. Osbahr" and Dembowski v. Central Con-
struction Co.,1 2 the Nebraska Supreme Court came to seemingly con-
flicting conclusions in two cases that presented strikingly similar
factual situations involving deceptive direct sales practices. The
purpose of the following analysis is to outline prior Nebraska law
in this area, to investigate the present status of Nebraska law in
this area, and to compare the decisions against the backdrop of the
Federal Trade Commission Act,'3 the Nebraska Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act,14 and Nebraska's constitutional prohibition of
lotteries.15
II. NEBRASKA'S FRAUDULENT DIRECT SALES
PRACTICES LAW PRIOR TO
OSBAHR AND DEMBOWSKI
The idea of deceptive sales practices in a classic direct selling
context is not foreign to Nebraska law. In the case of Schuster v.
North American Hotel Co.'6 the plaintiffs had purchased stock in
the North American Hotel Company from agents of the defendant
company. At the time of the sale the agents represented that
American Hotel and the Bankers Realty Company "were the same
company and the same people," and that American Hotel would
return to the purchaser the money paid for the stock after two
years if requested to do so. The subscription contract signed by
the plaintiffs when they purchased the stock was complete on its
face and contained a disclaimer that "no conditions, agreements or
representations, other than those printed above, shall bind the
1o Id. at 14.
11 186 Neb. 1, 180 N.W.2d 139 (1970).
12 186 Neb. 624, 185 N.W.2d 461 (1971), motion for rehearing overruled
May 18, 1971.
13 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964).
14 NEB. REV. STAT. § § 87-301 to -306 (Supp. 1969).
15 NEB. CONST. art. III, § 24.
16 106 Neb. 672, 184 N.W. 136 (1921), motion for rehearing denied, 106
Neb. 679, 186 N.W. 87 (1921).
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company." The plaintiffs alleged that they tendered their stock to
the defendant and requested a repayment of the purchase price, but
the defendant refused; therefore $2,000 kvith interest was due from
the defendant to the plaintiffs. The lower court directed a verdict
in favor of the plaintiffs, and the case was presented to the Nebraska
Supreme Court as an action based both upon the fraud of the agent
and upon the contract.17 On motion for rehearing, the two issues
presented for the determination of the court were the admissability
of parol evidence to prove the fraudulent representations and the
responsibility of the principal for the representations of his agents.
The supreme court first noted that when fraudulent promises
act as an inducement to the execution of a written contract, the
proper remedy is for fraud and not upon the oral promise as a
contractual obligation, for the oral promise as an obligation has
become merged in the written agreement and cannot, as such, be
legally proved.'8 However, the court was quick to point out that
although evidence of a parol promise cannot be shown for the
purpose of enlarging or changing the written contract where the
action is one to enforce the contract, such a rule is inapplicable
where the action is in fraud to rescind the contract and to prove
the oral promise as the fraudulent representation which acted as
the inducement to the sale.19
As to the issue of whether an oral promise, made in violation
of the limitation of the agent's authority as expressed by the dis-
claimer clause of a written sales contract, will constitute a fraud
for which the principal is responsible upon an action for recission
or for damages, the court articulated a specific test which has be-
come well-recognized in Nebraska agency law,20 the subject-matter
test.
The court noted that a principal may not relieve himself from
liability as to certain basic representations even by placing the
third party on notice that the agent is unauthorized to make repre-
sentations, and has in fact been directed not to make them:2 1
17 106 Neb. 672, 184 N.W. 136 (1921).
Is 106 Neb. 679, 682, 186 N.W. 87, 88 (1921). Crook v. O'Shea, 126 Neb.
67, 74, 252 N.W. 456, 458 (1934), provides: "[W]hen fraudulent prom-
ises act as the inducement to the execution of a written contract, the
remedy is for fraud, and not upon the oral promise as a contractual
obligation;" Paper v. Galbreth, 121 Neb. 454, 237 N.W. 582 (1931),
provides: "The defense on the ground of fraud may be shown by
parol, not to contradict or vary, but to destroy the legal and binding
effect of a written instrument."
19 106 Neb. 679, 683, 186 N.W. 87, 88 (1921).
20 Seavey, Agency, 1 (4) NEB. L. BuL. 5, 33-34 n.11 (1923).
21 Seavey, Agency, 2 (1) NEB. L. BuLL. 5, 16 n.31 (1923).
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It is quite generally held that a provision in a contract, to the effect
that the agent cannot bind the company by any representations,
statements or agreements, will not relieve the principal from
responsibility for the fraudulent representations, as to the subject-
matter of the contract, made by the agent, since such representa-
tions are within the scope of the agent's actual or ostensible authori-
ty . . . . Where he makes false representations concerning the
subject-matter of the contract, as distinguished at least from the
agreements and promises which are to be undertaken, the company
is responsible, and the buyer, when injured, may rescind the con-
tract on the ground of fraud.22
Therefore, an agent has ostensible authority to describe the goods
that he is selling, and when he makes representations as to their
quality and character he does so within the scope of his authority.
While the agent does have the authority to describe what he has
to sell, even in view of a written limitation of his authority, he does
not have the power to make a contract or to add stipulations to the
written contract furnished by his principal. When he fraudulently
represents himself as acting for the company in adding stipulations
to a self-limiting written contract, the agent acts outside the scope
of his ostensible authority, and the principal is not responsible for
his fraud.
In applying these enumerated principles of law to the facts of
the case, the court found the American Hotel Company not liable
for their agents' representation that the company would repurchase
the stock because the principal had restricted its obligation to the
stipulations contained in the written contract.23 The buyer was
bound to take notice that the agent had no authority to make
additional agreements for the company. Although the agents may
have been personally responsible for the fraud, the court did not
find that the representations made were a sufficient basis for action-
able fraud against the company.
Regarding the agents' representation that American Hotel and
the Bankers' Realty Company "were the same company and the
same people," the court classified it as one that dealt with the
subject-matter of the contract. As such, it was within the scope
of authority of the agents to make, and the defendant company
could not set up the contractual provision that it would not be
bound by the representation of its agents to bar an action for
fraud.24
22 106 Neb. at 684, 186 N.W. at 89 (1921) (emphasis added).
23 Id. at 687, 186 N.W. at 90.
24 Id at 688, 186 N.W. at 90.
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There are times, however, when the principal will be liable for
the promissory representations made by his agent. In the case of
Johnson v. Nebraska Building & Investment Co.25 a written contract
contained the same provisions limiting the agent's authority to bind
the company as were contained in Schuster, and the agent made
statements similar to those made in the Schuster case. The court
held the defendant liable. The promise made by the agent to the
third party to repurchase the stock was found to be so worded as
to be a representation of fact in view of a prospectus of the de-
fendant which read: "Provision is made for withdrawal of your
money after twelve months if you do desire." In addition, the
principal will be liable even for those representations made by the
agent to matters outside of the subject-matter of the contract if the
oral agreement is communicated to the principal before it acts to
ratify the contract.28
Where the remedy available to the third party is recission due
to the fraudulent representations of the agent regarding the subject-
matter of the contract, the question arises as to how soon the third
party must act in bringing his action against the principal. Because
recission requires the return to the seller of any goods received by
the buyer and an allowance to the seller for their fair and true
rental value,2 7 it may be unfair to always allow recission to take
place after performance by the principal when it is impossible to
return the goods to the seller. However, the Nebraska Supreme
Court has held in Faulkner v. Klamp2s that although the general
rule is that a party must restore the benefits received before he can
rescind a contract for fraud, he does not have to do so where the
consideration received is without value or where it is impossible,
25 109 Neb. 235, 190 N.W. 590 (1922).
26 Shimonek v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 109 Neb. 424, 425-26, 191
N.W. 668 (1922), provides: "Under the decision in Schuster v. North
American Hotel Co., 106 Neb. 679, it is clear that the representations
made by the agent as to the return of the plaintiff's money were un-
authorized by the defendant. It is equally clear that, after the facts
as to the making of such oral contract by the agent had been fully
communicated to the defendant company, it adopted and ratified the
contract as its own by making a series of payments according to
such contract, whereby the amount remaining due was reduced to
$1,131.87. This ratification had the same effect as an express authoriza-
tion to make the contract. Oberne v. Burke, 50 Neb. 764."
27 5 A. CoPsnm, CoNTRAcTs §§ 1107, 1114-15 (1951).
28 16 Neb. 174, 20 N.W. 220 (1884).
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impractical, or futile to restore the consideration. 29 What is re-
quired is that the right to rescind be promptly exercised upon dis-
covery of the fraud.30
III. THE OSBAHR AND DEMBOWSKI DECISIONS
Central Construction Co. v. Osbahr3 1 involved an action to fore-
close a mechanic's lien. The dispute was based on a home improve-
ment contract for the installation of plastic siding and aluminum
doors on the defendants' home. The district court, finding that the
written contract was procured by the Central Construction Com-
pany through fraud and misrepresentation, ordered that the written
contract be reformed to conform to the oral agreement of the
parties.
The Central Construction Company had initially contacted the
defendants, arranging a meeting to discuss the use of their residence
as a "model home." At the conclusion of a visit to the defendants'
home by two of the plaintiff's salesmen, the Osbahrs signed a printed
form contract that contained the following disclaimer clause:
There are no representations, guarantees or warranties except such
as may herein be incorporated, if any, nor any agreement collateral
hereto, nor is this contract dependent upon or subject to any con-
ditions not herein stated. Any subsequent agreement in reference
hereto shall be binding only if in writing and if signed by all
parties. Owner(s) understand and agree that contractor does not
make, and no agent of contractor is authorized to make, any agree-
ment with Owner(s) either concerning the use of the Owner(s)'
premises as a 'model home' or concerning any payments, credits
or commissions to be received by Owner (s) for referrals of prospec-
tive customers. Owner (s) further understand and agree that, in
the event Owner (s) make any such agreements with any person
whomsoever, Contractor has no responsibility whatsoever for the
performance of such agreements. Contractor does hereby ex-
pressly disaffirm any such agreements purportedly made on his
behalf.32
29 "Where in a trade or barter of property the trade is procured by one
of the parties by false and fradulent representations as to the quality
of the property disposed of by him, the defrauded party may, upon
the discovery of the fraud, rescind the contract and maintain replevin
for the property procured by such fraud. And this may be done
without returning the property received by the defrauded party when
such return is impossible, or where the party guilty of the fraud has
by his own act put it out of the power of such defrauded party to make
such return." Id. (emphasis added).
30 Arnold v. Dowd, 85 Neb. 108, 122 N.W. 680 (1909).
31 186 Neb. 1, 180 N.W.2d 139 (1970).
32 Id. at 2, 180 N.W.2d at 140.
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The defendants told the plaintiff's salesmen that they could not
afford the expense of any home improvements. However, the sales-
men assured them that since their home would be used as a "model,"
certain payments resulting from the sale of the plaintiff's products
arising out of the use of the defendants' home as a "model" would
be credited to and would discharge the defendants' obligation under
the contract. An oral agreement to that effect was made. The de-
fendants were told that the written contract did not really apply to
them because theirs was to be a "model home," and the printed
form was only the form for standard contracts.
The issues on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme Court were
whether the trial court erred in admitting parol evidence to vary
the terms of the written contract and in finding that the written
contract was procured by the plaintiff through fraud and misrepre-
sentation. 33
In a unanimous opinion the court held that parol evidence was
admissible to show, for the purpose of invalidating a written in-
strument, that the execution of such instrument was procured by
fraud and that it does not express the true intent of the parties.
Furthermore, such a rule is not to be rendered inapplicable because
there is an agreement in the contract to the effect that "no verbal
agreements affecting its validity will be recognized."3 4 Upon the
issue of fraud in the procurement of the contract, the court said:
Fraud in a transaction may be proved by inferences which may
reasonably be drawn from intrinsic evidence respecting the tran-
saction itself, such as inadequacy of consideration, or extrinsic
circumstances surrounding the transaction.35
Dembowski v. Central Construction Co.36 was an action brought
in equity to reform a contract. The district court granted the home-
owner's prayer for reformation. The facts in this case were essen-
tially the same as in Osbahr; however, the Dembowski's contract
with Central Construction was signed a month earlier. In Dem-
bowski the defendant construction company had different counsel
who raised a different issue on appeal to the Nebraska Supreme
Court,37 i.e., the responsibility of the defendant principal for the
33 Id. at 3, 180 N.W.2d at 141.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 5, 180 N.W.2d at 142.
36 186 Neb. 624, 185 N.W.2d 461 (1971), motion for rehearing overruled
May 18, 1971.
37 Attorneys may often be heard to lament that they have no chance of
winning a case because the facts are against them. The result in
Dembowski clearly shows the influence new counsel can have on a
case.
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fraud of his agent.3 8 The court, with two justices dissenting,39
brushed aside the Dembowski's reliance on the Osbahr decision 0
and said that "[a]lthough based on similar facts, this case must be
distinguished from the one before us as the issue here [agency] was
not raised or presented in the Osbahr case."',,
The court, apparently overlooking that the equitable relief
granted by the lower court was reformation, found that the principal
had no knowledge of his agent's fraudulent acts until after the
contract had been entered into and fully performed by the de-
fendant, and applied the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 2604 in
holding that "the equitable remedy of recission is denied after per-
formance by the principal. '43
In Osbahr, based on the previous decision of Chapin v. Noll,4 4 the
court correctly held that parol evidence is admissible to show, for
the purpose of invalidating a written instrument, that its execution
was procured by fraud, or that, by reason of fraud, it does not
express the true intentions of the parties.45 However, in affirming
the lower court's order that the written contract be reformed to
conform to the oral agreement of the parties instead of rescinding
the agreement, the Osbahr court seems to have erred by acting
contrary to the Schuster46 opinion which noted that when fraudu-
lent promises act as an inducement to the execution of a written
contract, the proper remedy is either in tort for damages or in con-
tract for rescission, but in any case, no action can be had upon the
oral promise as a contractual obligation. Why the Osbahr court
38 186 Neb. 624, 625, 185 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1971).
39 Id. at 628, 185 N.W.2d at 464 (Spencer & McCown, JJ., dissenting).
40 Throughout the litigation the Dembowskis were represented by the
same counsel that had successfully represented the Osbahrs.
41 186 Neb. at 625-26, 185 N.W.2d at 463 (1971).
42 RESTATVMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260 (1958), cited by the court in
Dembowski, states:
"(1) An innocent principal can, by contract with another, relieve
himself of liability for deceit because of unauthorized fraud by a
servant or other agent upon the other party.(2) A contract with, or conveyance to, the principal obtained by his
agent through misrepresentations can be rescinded by the other party
to the contract or conveyance prior to a change or position by the
principal, even though the contract provides that it shall not be affected
by misrepresentations not contained therein and includes a statement
that the agent has made no representations."
43 186 Neb. at 626, 185 N.W.2d at 463 (1971).
44 118 Neb. 318, 224 N.W. 687 (1929).
45 186 Neb. 1, 4, 180 N.W.2d 139, 141 (1970).
46 106 Neb. 679, 186 N.W. 87 (1921).
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failed to comment on this distinction is not clear. The Chapin case,
cited by the Osbahr court for the proposition that parol evidence is
always admissible for invalidating a written agreement due to
fraudulent promises, expressly followed the Schuster rule that evi-
dence of a parol promise cannot be shown for the purpose of en-
larging or changing the written contract, although such evidence
is admissible where the action is in fraud for damages or to rescind
the contract and prove the oral promises as the fraudulent repre-
sentation which acted as an inducement to contract.47
In Dembowski the plaintiff sought reformation of the written
contract. Although the supreme court did not deal with the issue
of the admissibility of parol evidence in that case, it is clear that
the remedy of reformation is inappropriate based on the Schuster
holding for it seeks the enlargement and enforcement of the original
contract.48 The plaintiff might well have lost his case at this stage
due to his improper choice of remedies.
In Dembowski, unlike Osbahr, the question of the principal's
liability for the fraudulent representations of his agent was raised.
Although the same issue was raised in Schuster v. North American
Hotel Co.49 and Shimonek v. Nebraska Building & Investment Co.,50
the Dembowski court treats the issue differently. In Schuster the
court held that a principal could not relieve himself of liability by
a disclaimer clause for those representations made by his agent
regarding the subject-matter of the contract, because the agent has
actual or ostensible authority to describe the goods, and he is acting
within such authority when he makes representations as to their
quality and character. However, when the contract contains a dis-
claimer clause and the agent adds promissory stipulations not deal-
ing with the subject-matter of the contract, the agent acts outside
the scope of his authority; the principal is not responsible for his
fraud. If the principal became aware that his agent made such
unauthorized representations, ratification after notification was held
by Shimonek to have the same effect as express authorization.5 '
Instead of routinely following the Schuster and Shimonek opinions
as controlling, the Dembowski court, having found that the principal
had no knowledge of his agent's fraudulent acts until after the
contract had been entered into and fully performed by the de-
47 Chapin v. Noll, 118 Neb. 318, 325, 224 N.W. 687, 689 (1929).
48 Note 18 supra.
49 106 Neb. 679, 186 N.W. 87 (1921).
50 109 Neb. 424, 191 N.W. 668 (1922).
51 Note 26 supra.
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fendant, applied the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 26052 in
holding that "the equitable remedy of recission is denied after per-
formance by the principal."53 Does the adoption of this new line
of reasoning work any changes in prior Nebraska law?
The adoption of the Restatement position does not appear to
make any changes in the parol evidence rules adopted by the court
in the Schuster case.54 The important question raised by the Re-
statement position [a contract which the principal obtained through
misrepresentations by the agent can be rescinded by the other party
to the contract prior to a change in position by the principal] is
whether or not the Schuster distinction between misrepresentations
concerning the subject-matter of the contract and those outside of
the subject-matter is destroyed. Although the Dembowski opinion
does not deal elaborately with the law in this area, the better view
is that the use of the term "misrepresentations" in Section 260
should be limited to those made with reference to matters outside
of the subject-matter of the contract,55 thereby not abolishing the
52 Note 42 supra.
53 Note 43 supra.
54 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260, Comment d at 569 (1958)
provides: "The rule stated in this Subsection does not offend the parol
evidence rule, since the rule prevents the modification of an integrated
contract by statements not a part of it, whereas by this rule the effect
of the contract is avoided. If the agent, instead of making a statement
of existing facts, makes a promise which is at variance with the state-
ments in the integrated contract, the other party cannot show such
promise to vary the terms of the agreement, under the rules stated
in the Restatement of Contracts, Sections 237-244. If, however, the
unauthorized promises are not at variance with the integrated con-
tract and would be enforceable against the principal if authorized,
the principal cannot enforce the terms authorized without ratifying
the unauthorized promises, although the other party had notice that
the agent was not authorized to make them."
55 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260, Comment c at 567-68
(1958) which provides: "A statement in the contract between the
principal and a third person that the agent has no authority to make
statements is a notification that any statements not implicit in the
transaction... are unauthorized .... [Statements "not implicit in the
transaction" must mean those outside the subject-matter of the con-
tract as those concerning the subject-matter are implicit in the tran-
saction and part of the agent's ostensible authority for which the
principal is liable under Nebraska law.] On the face of the document,
these statements place the entire risk of reliance upon the third per-
son. . . . But where such statements are inserted in the contract the
purchaser tends to regard them as merely formal statements and is
not put upon his guard against deceptions. The document has been
prepared by the principal, usually on advice of attorneys and, at least
if the purchaser is not expert in business, should not override the fact
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Schuster distinctions, but adding a new expression of the Shimonek
rule.5 6
In the Schuster opinion the court did not deal with how soon
the third party must act to rescind the contract due to the fraudu-
lent representations of the agent concerning the subject-matter of
the contract; however, Nebraska cases hold recission must be
promptly exercised in instances of fraudulent representations as to
the subject-matter of the contract.57 Change of position by the de-
frauding party is no defense.58 This is also the position adopted by
the Restatement (Second) of Agency § 259.59 While Schuster held
that the defrauded party was unable to rescind due to the fraudulent
representations of the agent concerning matters outside of the
subject-matter, the Restatement position" allowing recission if ex-
ercised before performance by the principal when representations
by the agent fall outside the subject-matter of the contract, is not
in conflict with the Shimonek view holding the principal liable when
ratification follows notification of such representations.
The only shortcoming of the rule adopted by Dembowski, i.e.,
limiting recission to a time before a change in position by the
principal in those instances of fraud relating to matters outside the
subject-matter of the contract, is that such a rule is poorly suited
to the home improvement sales area. It allows the principal to
escape liability in almost every instance. Since the mere shipping or
delivery of the goods covered by the contract is not considered such
a change of position as will deprive the buyer of his remedy,61 the
that the latter has in fact been deceived. The principal to some extent
has represented that his agent is worthy of belief, and any contributory
fault of the plaintiff should not bar him from obtaining the relatively
mild remedy of rescission." (Emphasis added).
56 Shimonek v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 109 Neb. 424, 425-26, 191
N.W. 668 (1922).
57 Arnold v. Dowd, 85 Neb. 108, 122 N.W. 680 (1909).
58 Cf. Faulkner v. Klamp, 16 Neb. 174, 20 N.W. 220 (1884).
59 REsAT lENT (SEcoND) OF AcCY § 259 (1958) states:
"(1) A transaction into which one is induced to enter by reliance
upon untrue and material representations as to the subject-matter,
made by a servant or other agent entrusted with its preliminary or
final negotiations, is subject to recission at the election of the person
deceived.
"(2) Change of position by the principal:
(a) is a defense if the agent has no power to bind the principal
by the misrepresentations;
(b) is not a defense if the principal was liable for the mis-
representations."
60 Note 42 supra.
61 See Harnischfeger Sales Corp. v. Coats, 4 Cal.2d 319, 48 P.2d 662 (1955).
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seller is well-advised to act quickly in installing his product so as
to effectuate a change in position before the buyer discovers any
possible fraud relating to matters outside the subject-matter of the
contract and communicates such findings to the principal. The effect
is to use the law to deny recission to the buyer6 2 in those many
instances where he is not likely to discover he was defrauded until
after the work on his home is completed. In this respect the Dem-
bowski opinion effectively condones such fraudulent practices and
allows businessmen to benefit from fraud, thereby promoting a
disrespect for our legal system by both the fraudulent and the
defrauded.
IV. ARGUMENTS FOR A DIFFERENT DECISION
A. THE FEDERAL TRADE CoizISSION ACT AND = NEBRASKA UNIFORM
DECEPTIVE PRACTICES ACT
The Federal Trade Commission Act, as amended, imposes upon
the Federal Trade Commission not only the duty to prevent unfair
methods of competition but also "unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices in commerce. ' ' 63 The Commission has proceeded not only
against practices forbidden by statute or the common law, but also
against practices not previously considered unlawful, and thus it
has created a new body of law-a law of unfair trade practices
adapted to the diverse and changing needs of our complex competi-
tive system.
Because the Federal Trade Commission Act only prohibits those
unfair practices "in commerce," the states surrounding Nebraska
have adopted strong legislation permitting court-ordered restitution
to consumers in situations where the state attorney general is
authorized to seek injunctions prohibiting "any deception, deceptive
act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or misrepre-
sentation . . . in connection with the sale or advertisement of any
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) or AGENCY § 260 (1958).
63 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964). This latter aspect of the Commission's mandate
was added to the Federal Trade Commission Act in 1938 as part of the
Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the Act. Wheeler-Lea Trade Commission
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 44-45, 52-58 (1964). One of the purposes of this
amendment was to make clear that the protection of competitors and
the competitive process is a concern of public policy within the Fed-
eral Trade Commission. The legislative history of the Wheeler-Lea
Amendment to Section Five of the Act discloses explicit and substantial
concern with the exploitation of consumers through deceptive, un-
ethical or otherwise unfair practices. See S. Rep. No. 1705, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 3 (1936); see also S. Rep. No. 221, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 3
(1937).
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merchandise .... " 64 The courts are empowered to make such order,
including appointment of a receiver, as may be necessary "to restore
any person in interest any monies or property... real or personal"
acquired by any of the practices declared unlawful.65
The statutory law regarding deceptive trade practices in Ne-
braska has not developed to the extent of that enacted in her sur-
rounding sister states. A Nebraskan who may be damaged by a
deceptive trade practice "may be granted an injunction against it
under the principles of equity."66 Included in the practices deemed
deceptive by the Nebraska Legislature upon the adoption of the
Nebraska Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act 67 are the making
of "false or misleading statements of fact concerning the reasons
for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions,"6 8 and engaging
"in any other conduct which similarly creates a likelihood of con-
fusion or of misunderstanding."69 This latter definition should allow
the state courts to apply the crystallized principles and examples
of -unfair trade practice law developed under the Federal Trade
Commission Act.70 And there is a great wealth of law from which
to analogize.
For example, it has been designated unfair to alter printed con-
tracts as an inducement for the purchaser's signature, and then
enforce the contract as though no change has been made.7 1 It
has also been held that inserting in an order blank a disclaimer of
liability for promises or representations made to purchasers by
salesmen is an unfair practice.72
In addition, the Federal Trade Commission has prohibited repre-
senting that a customer's building is to be used for advertising the
64 See COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 55-5-7 (1) (Supp. 1969); IowA CODE ANN.
§ 713.24(7) (1966); KAN. STAT. AN. § 50-602 (Supp. 1968); Mo. ANx.
STAT. § 407.100 (Supp. 1968); S.D. COmPILED LAws ANN. § 37-24-23
(1967).
65 See COLO. REv. STAT. AxN. § 55-5-7(1) (Supp. 1969); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 713.24(7) (Supp. 1969); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-608 (Supp. 1968);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 407.100 (Supp. 1968); S.D. COmP. LAWS ANN.
§ 37-24-29 (1967). It should be noted that the Missouri statute makes
no specific provision for the appointment of a receiver but the court
might have this power under its authority to "make such orders orjudgments as may be necessary."
60 NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-303 (Supp. 1969).
67 NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-301 to -306 (Supp. 1969).
68 NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-302 (a) (11) (Supp. 1969).
69 NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-302(a) (12) (Supp. 1969).
70 See NEB. REv. STAT. § 87-305 (Supp. 1969).
71 The Time Sales Co., 25 F.T.C. 464 (1937).
72 Beho Rubber Co., 34 F.T.C. 457 (1941).
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seller's product with benefits to the customer by way of reduced
prices, discounts or refunds. In a specific case involving the home
improvement sale of siding, the Commission has prohibited repre-
senting that a prospective purchaser's home had been selected as
a "model home" or that owners would receive money or other
things of value predicated upon similar work being done on other
homes in the community. 3 And in a particularly interesting case,
the Central Construction Company of Omaha, Nebraska, the princi-
pal actor in both the Osbahr and the Dembowski cases, was ordered
to cease and desist from representing that the building of their
purchasers would be used for demonstrations or advertising pur-
poses or that they would pay commissions to purchasers when sales
were made as the result of such demonstrations.7 4
Thus, it should be obvious that cases such as Osbahr and Dem-
bowski involve more than just contract law or agency law; both
cases involve deceptive trade practices which are unlawful under
Section Five of the Federal Trade Commission Act if "in commerce,"
and which, by analogy, have now been made unlawful in Nebraska
with the adoption of the Nebraska Uniform Deceptive Trade Prac-
times Act.75 Therefore, in the future, contracts similar to those in
Osbahr and Dembowski may be properly classified as against public
policy and not enforceable by the court.7 6
B. THE NEBRASKA PROHIBITION AGAINST LoTTEaIES
There is no dispute that lotteries are prohibited in Nebraska.77
In addition to the constitutional prohibition, the setting up, pro-
73 Commerce Contracting Co., 59 F.T.C. 473 (1961).
74 Central Constr. Co., 59 F.T.C. 966 (1961). This consent order required
the Central Construction Company to cease representing falsely in
advertising and through its salesmen that: (1) it offered reduced rates
to home and building owners who permitted their property to be used
for demonstrations and advertising; (2) that it would pay them com-
missions on resulting sales to others; (3) that said offers must be
accepted at once; and (4) that the soliciting salesman was an officer,
co-owner, or engineer of the corporation. It should be noted that a
respondent's execution of a "consent to cease and desist" is for settle-
ment purposes only and does not constitute an admission of the
charges summarized therein.
75 NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-304(a) (3) (Supp. 1969), provides that the Ne-
braska Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act shall not apply to
"[a]ctions or appeals pending on December 25, 1969."
76 See 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 1371-75, 1529 (1952); REINSTATEMENT
OF CONTRACTS § 580 (1932); 3 S. WILLISTON, SALES §§ 663-81 (1948).
77 NEB. CONST. art III, § 24 provides: "The Legislature shall not authorize
any game of chance nor any lottery or gift enterprise where the con-
sideration for a chance to participate involves the payment of money
for the purchase of property, services, chance or admission ticket, or
requires an expenditure of substantial effort or time ...."
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moting or conducting of a lottery is made a crime by statute.1 8 It
logically follows that if the methods used in the inducement of a
contract constituted an illegal lottery, any sales contract so induced
by such methods should be unenforceable by the courts because the
contract would be against public policy. In adopting this logic,
several jurisdictions have held sales contracts unenforceable where
accompanied by referral-sales schemes similar to those found in
Osbahr and Dembowski. 9
In Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach"0 Lifetone Elec-
tronics, Inc. had sold the respondent consumer a radio intercom
and fire alarm system on a conditional sales contract. As part of
the transaction a representative's commission agreement was exe-
cuted by which the consumer would receive a commission for each
sale to any person referred to Lifetone by the consumer. The con-
sumer was assured that the commission would be at least adequate
to cover his purchase price so that by purchasing the equipment he
thought he was getting it for nothing. The sales contract was then
assigned to the appellant who sued the respondent consumer for
the unpaid purchase price. The Washington Supreme Court pointed
out that lotteries were illegal in Washington,"' and held that the
representative's commission agreement was an illegal lottery and
that the conditional sales contract, having been an integral part of
the same transaction, was tainted with such illegality and unen-
forceable.
The court found that all three essential elements of a lottery,
i.e., the distribution of money or property (prize), chance, and a
valuable consideration paid or agreed to be paid for the chance,
were present in a referral sales scheme.8 2 It was further determined
by the court that the consumer's hoped-for commissions constituted
a prize and that the purchase price amounted to consideration paid
in an effort to get the prize. Chance was found to permeate the
78 NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-961 (Reissue 1964).
79 E.g., State v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc.2d 39, 56-61, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 324-29
(Sup. Ct. 1966); Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach, 67
Wash.2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965).
80 67 Wash.2d 630, 409 P.2d 160 (1965).
81 WAs. CONsT. art. II, § 24 provides: "The legislature shall never autho-
rize any lottery .... "; WAs. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.59.010 (1961) further
provides: "A lottery is a scheme for the distribution of money or
property by chance, among persons who have paid or agreed to pay
a valuable consideration for the chance, whether it shall be called a
lottery, raffle, gift enterprise, or by any other name, and is hereby
declared unlawful and a public nuisance."
82 67 Wash.2d 630, 634-35, 409 P.2d 160, 162-63 (1965).
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scheme in that the consumers took a chance that other consumers
might not be interested, that the salesmen might not make adequate
presentations and that the salesmen might not even contact any
more consumers.
A similar result was reached in State v. ITM, Inc.,8 a special
proceeding brought by the Attorney General of New York to enjoin
the promoters of a referral sales program from further engaging in
alleged fraudulent and illegal practices. The sales scheme consisted
of inducing a consumer to sign an installment contract for the pur-
chase of one of the seller's products8 4 and the execution of an
additional commission agreement providing for payment to the
consumer of an agreed amount for each sale resulting to buyers
referred by the consumer to the respondent seller. In granting the
injunction the court found, among other things, that "[t]he re-
spondents were guilty of persistent illegal acts in conducting a
lottery and all contracts are 'utterly void.' ",85
In Nebraska the term "lottery" is also defined by statute,8 6 and
the Nebraska Supreme Court has consistently held that the three
traditional elements constituting a lottery, i.e., a prize, consideration
and chance, must be present in a scheme if it is to be labeled a
lottery.8 7
83 52 Misc.2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
84 The respondents were engaged in the home selling of color television
sets, central vacuum cleaning systems and electric quartz boilers.
85 52 Misc. 2d 39, 62, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303, 329 (Sup. Ct. 1966). Noting that
the Supreme Court of Washington had unanimously held a similar
scheme to be a lottery in Sherwood & Roberts-Yakima, Inc. v. Leach,
the court characterized New York's constitutional prohibition of lot-
teries (N.Y. CONST. art I, §9) as stronger than its Washington counter-
part and its statutory definitions (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1370 (McKinney
1967) ) as similarly containing the traditionally and universally recog-
nized elements of a lottery, i.e., consideration, prize (distribution of
property) and chance, all of which were contained in Washington's
similar law, in reaching the same conclusion as to the voidability of a
sales contract connected with an illegal sales scheme. Id. at 57-60, 275
N.Y.S.2d at 324-27.
86 NEB. RE V. STAT. § 28-963.01 (Reissue 1964) declares: "[A] lottery or
scheme of chance shall mean any scheme, plan or promotion contain-
ing the elements of prize, chance, and consideration where the con-
sideration for a chance to participate involves the payment of money
for the purchase of property, services, chance, or admission ticket, or
requires the expediture of substantial effort or time ...."
87 State ex rel. Hunter v. Omaha Motion Picture Exhibitors Ass'n, 139
Neb. 312, 297 N.W. 547 (1941); Chamber of Commerce v. Kieck, 128
Neb. 13, 257 N.W. 493 (1934); State v. Nebraska Home Co., 66 Neb. 349,
92 N.W. 763 (1902).
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Thus, the facts found by the court to have existed in both Osbahr
and Dembowski clearly place the sales practices used in inducing
the execution of the contracts in those cases within the meaning of
a "lottery" as such term is defined in Nebraska. Both the Osbahrs
and the Dembowskis were to receive commissions (the prize) and
agreed to pay the purchase price of the siding (the consideration)
in an effort to get the prize. The element of chance permeated the
entire scheme in that the Osbahrs and Dembowskis took a chance
that the salesmen might poorly make their presentations, that there
was no market, that the salesmen might drop all efforts at complet-
ing more sales, and that they [the buyers] would get something for
nothing. As such, selling schemes like those found in Osbahr and
Dembowski are contrary to the terms and policy of Nebraska law
and therefore illegal and unenforceable, and where such an illegal
scheme is intimately connected with a contract, that contract be-
comes tainted with that illegality and is likewise unenforceable."
V. CONCLUSION
Considered carefully, the Osbahr and Dembowski decisions do
not substantially change existing Nebraska law in the field of
fraudulent direct sales practices established by the Schuster and
Shimonek decisions of the early 1920's. The seller-principal, inno-
cent of any wrongdoing on the part of his agent, 9 remains strictly
88 Note 76 supra. Of course, proceeding under an illegal lottery theory
may still be limited in Nebraska when the principal divorces himself
from liability for the unauthorized fraudulent representations of his
agent in reference to matters outside the subject-matter of the com-
pleted contract. In both Osbahr and Dembowski the agent's repre-
sentations were oral and outside of the "four corners" of the contract.
89 Rescission of a contract is allowed by Schuster only if the agent made
fraudulent representations as to the subject-matter of the contract,
notwithstanding the presence of a disclaimer clause in the contract.
Change of position by the principal is no defense to rescission for the
fraudulent representations made concerning the subject-matter of the
contract. Faulkner v. Klamp, 16 Neb. 174, 20 N.W. 220 (1884); REsTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF AGENcY § 259 (1958). The right to recission in such
instances depends upon the promptness of action in rescinding after
discovery of the fraud. Arnold v. Dowd, 85 Neb. 108, 122 N.W. 680
(1909).
Recission is now allowed if the agent's fraudulent representations
are outside of the subject-matter of the contract but communicated to
the principal before the principal acts to ratify the contract. Dem-
bowski v. Central Constr. Co., 186 Neb. 624, 185 N.W.2d 461 (1971);
REsTATEVIENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 260 (2) (1958). Ratification after
notification has the same effect as an express authorization to make the
contract. Shimonek v. Nebraska Bldg. & Inv. Co., 109 Neb. 424, 425-26,
191 N.W. 668 (1922).
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liable in an action for rescission only for those representations made
as to the subject-matter of the contract, a disclaimer clause being
effective to relieve the principal of liability for those unknown
representations made by the agent which do not concern the sub-
ject-matter of the contract. In addition, parol evidence remains
admissible for showing such fraudulent representations as a means
to invalidate the contract; thus recission of the contract or a suit
in fraud for damages is the defrauded party's proper remedy, not
reformation or any other remedy which seeks to enlarge and en-
force the contract.
But to the layman the Osbahr decision appeared to indicate that
in the area of merchant-consumer relations the Nebraska Supreme
Court had taken into account the realities of the marketplace where
false representations are frequently used to induce buyers to sign
form contracts designed to cut off their legal remedies. However,
the appearances generated by Osbahr proved to be short-lived.
Shortly thereafter, the Dembowski case came before the court, and
a victim of the same fraudulent sales practice used by the same
salesman involved in the Osbahr case, the same fraudulent sales
scheme for which the Central Construction Company had been cited
by the Federal Trade Commission ten years earlier, 0 found himself
without a remedy because the admittedly fraudulent representations
were outside of the subject-matter of the contract, and the innocent
principal had already performed.
With an eye to the magnitude of the consumer fraud problem
in the direct sales area, the usefulness of such distinctions as ex-
pressed by Schuster and Dembowski continue to be recognized by
an increasingly smaller and smaller group of people both inside and
outside the legal profession. As a result of this growing dissatisfac-
tion, efforts have been made since 1930 to legislate these tenuous
distinctions out of existence. Pending the passage of increasingly
effective federal or state legislation, future Nebraska consumers who
In the presence of a disclaimer clause a plaintiff cannot recover
damages in a tort action for fraud or deceit unless the principal is
shown to be not "innocent." An innocent principal can, by contract
with another, relieve himself of liability for tort actions because of
unauthorized fraud by a servant or other agent upon another party.
Dembowski v. Central Constr. Co., 186 Neb. 624, 626, 185 N.W.2d 461,
463 (1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 260(1) (1958). Of
course, if the principal obtained knowledge of the unauthorized acts
of his agent prior to a change in position, tort recovery would be
allowed notwithstanding the presence of a disclaimer clause. Maxiner
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 133 Neb. 574, 276 N.W. 163 (1937).
90 Note 74 supra and accompanying text.
FRAUDULENT DIRECT SALES SCHEMES 339
proceed under either a strict unfair trade practices approach based
on the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Nebraska Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act or an illegal activity approach based
on Nebraska's constitutional prohibition of lotteries should find
that the courts will grant recission of their contracts on the grounds
that they are void as against public policy. The results obtained by
proceeding under either of these theories should give consumers a
viable weapon against the widespread use of fraudulent sales prac-
tices and end the confusion existing in this area of Nebraska law
which can too easily be made to favor the unscrupulous.
Richard Wegener '73
